Constructing an efficient and accurate model from security events to determine an attack scenario for an enterprise network is challenging. In this paper, we discuss how to use the information obtained from security events to construct an attack scenario and build an evidence graph. To achieve the accuracy and completeness of the evidence graph, we use Prolog inductive and abductive reasoning to correlate evidence by reasoning the causality, and use an anti-forensics database and a corresponding attack graph to find the missing evidence.
INTRODUCTION
Investigators of digital crime look for evidence so that they can construct potential attack scenarios with the hope that they can be more convincing than the ones presented by the defense. However, attackers who launch attacks against enterprise networks tend to use sophisticated techniques such as multi-host, multi-step attacks and anti-forensics, which makes finding real evidence difficult. Besides, the defense may question the admissibility of presented evidence, rebut the arguments presented by the prosecution or present an alternative scenario that fits the evidence presented by the prosecution that would absolve the accused of wrongdoing. Consequently, using incomplete evidence to re-construct the attack scenario that can withstand a rebuttal is challenging.
Enterprise systems generate events to show their state changes that are categorized by criticality and recorded in event logs. Although the topic of using IDS logs as forensic evidence has been controversial, they provide the first level of information for forensics analyst [4] . Many researchers have proposed to aggregate redundant alerts and correlate them to determine multi-step attacks [1, 9] . However, most reported work used non-automated ad-hoc methods. In order to partially automate forensic analysis, Wang et al. proposed a hierarchical reasoning framework to correlate alerts using so-called local rules and group them using socalled global rules [7] . The end result of this hierarchical reasoning system forms an evidence graph that visualizes multi-host, multi-step attacks in an enterprise network.
Although there is extensive work regarding using evidential reasoning in formulating hypothesis and collecting evidence in criminal investigations [2] , to the best of our knowledge, [7] is one of the few that proposed to use reasoning to correlate attack scenarios represented by security event alerts. However, this work did not implement an end-to-end system to fully automate the forensics analysis process. Besides, this work left two problems unresolved: (1) Variable alternative hypotheses could explain the same attack scenario in the situation where the evidence has been destroyed, but only one of them is correct; (2) The evidence that can provide security advice to a network administrator might not be admissible in a court of law. In this paper, we propose to implement a Prolog reasoning based model to automate multi-host, multi-stage vulnerability analysis on an attacked enterprise network. Because Prolog can easily query information from SQL database table and is well known to be more suitable tool for implementing programs with explicit domain knowledge representation [7] . Also, we propose to use an anti-forensics database and a corresponding logical attack graph to help resolve the two problems mentioned above. We implement our model by extending an end-to-end framework and reasoning system MulVAL [13, 15] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes background. Section 3 is related work. Section 4 describes the experimental network, and Section 5 introduces attack graphs and the tool used in the paper. Section 6 is our main contribution, which describes our model of building evidence graphs for network attack analysis under the situation where anti-forensics is used. We conclude this paper in Section 7.
BACKGROUND

Digital Forensics and Anti-forensics
Digital forensics uses scientifically validated methods to collect, validate and preserve digital evidence derived from digital sources [20] . Digital forensics investigators analyze data from enterprise systems and use imaging and analysis tools to extract data from physical or storage media memory to do content analysis [23] . While live analysis risks getting changing data from a computer, dead analysis, although better, requires terminating all system processes [23] .
Analyzing network data presumes that some monitoring tools have saved network traffic or event logs [24, 25] . Network IDS alerts provide first clues about potential attacks. However, the large quantities and false positives of the IDS alerts make the analysis difficult. As a solution, [5] uses a fault graph based on safety properties and security policies to impose a structure on log data so that the IDS can decide what data is necessary to log for forensic analysis in a way that facilitates determining the attack scenario and its effect.
Attackers use anti-forensics tools as attempts that negatively affect the existence, amount, and/or quality of evidence from a crime scene, or make the examination of evidence difficult or impossible to conduct [21] . Current anti-forensic techniques include (1) attacking data and (2) attacking tools [21] . Techniques used to attack data include overwriting stored (meta) data, deleting files or media, hiding information using obfuscation, steganography, encryption or unallocated (slack) spaces, etc. [21] . Techniques used to attack forensics tools interfere with or mislead forensic analysis by crafting images or data that is unusable by tools [14] .
Evidence Graph
An Evidence Graph is a graphical model that presents intrusion evidence and their dependency, which can be used to ascertain multi-stage, multi-step attacks in enterprise networks [7] . We modify the formal definition from [11] as follows.
Definition 1(Evidence Graph): An evidence graph is a sextuple G=(N h ,N e ,E, L, N h -Attr, N e -Attr , ), where N h and N e are two set of disjoint nodes representing host computers involved in the attack and its related evidence; E ⊆(N h ×N e ) ∪(N e ×N h ); L is mapping from a node to its label; N h -Attr and N e -Attr are attributes to host and evidence nodes respectively.
• Attributes for Host Nodes a. Host ID: Identity of a host node. b. States: Host node category consisting of one or many of the "source", "target", "stepping-stone" and "affiliated". Affiliated hosts have suspicious interactions with an attacker, one of victims or stepping-stone. c. Time stamps: Time stamps that record the attack states of a machine.
• Attributes for Evidence Nodes a. General attributes: Includes event initiator, event target, event description and event time stamp(s). b. Relevancy: Measurement of impact on attack success, which includes the irrelevant true positive = 0, Unable to verify = 0.5 and Relevant true positive =1.
MulVAL, Prolog and Datalog
In this paper, we use and extend MulVAL, a Datalog based attack graph generation system, to reason the correlation between evidence collected allegedly after a multi-stage, multi-step attack. We also use XSB [17] , a Prolog based inmemory deductive database engine as a rule engine [3] .
RELATED WORK
Reasoning has been used to link evidence and claims about attacks by using expert knowledge. In this area, [2] uses inductive and abductive reasoning to model potential crime scenarios and correlate evidence, and [6] uses a Bayesian inference to evaluate how well a given criminal evidence can choose one scenario over possible alternatives. However, both works are based on traditional criminal forensics. For network forensics, [7] uses a global and local reasoning system that is based on expert knowledge to correlate evidence and intuitively visualize attack scenarios by creating an evidence graph. In this work, rule based fuzzy cognitive map is used to model expert knowledge in order to reason the evidence correlation. Neither work [2, 6] nor [7] uses Prolog programming language to formalize expert knowledge, evidence, and access control policy to automate network attack analysis, which is our contribution in this paper. Besides, [7] did not consider how to handle the situations where anti-forensics techniques have been used and there might be variable alternative hypotheses about the missing evidence, which instead will be discussed in this paper. Figure 1 is the topology of an experimental network we use in this paper. Table 1 has the IP addresses of computers and their vulnerability information. In Figure 1 , the external Firewall 1 controls network access from the Internet to the enterprise network, where a webserver hosts two web services--Apache HTTP Server at Port 80 and Apache Tomcat Server at Port 8080. The internal Firewall 2 controls the access to a SQL database server, which can be accessed by the webserver and employees' workstations in the network. The administrator has administrative privilege on the webservers. SNORT is used as an IDS and firewall in this network. We also configured both web servers and the database server to log all access and queries. Sample of the SNORT alerts, web server access records and Database query log is displayed in Appendix 1.
EXPERIMENTAL NETWORK
ATTACK GRAPHS AND TOOLS
Attack graphs can serve as a basis for network attack detection, defense and forensics analysis [10] . Given a set of vulnerabilities in a system, an attack graph analysis provides investigators with potential attack steps that the attacker can take to reach the attack goals. In this paper, we use an attack graph as an assistance tool to find missing evidence. We redefined Ou et al.'s logical attack graph model [15] as follows [11] . This model uses logical statements in the form of primitive facts to represent network configurations and vulnerabilities. A derived node consists of facts derived by applying an interaction rule to other primitive facts and prior derived facts. A successful interaction is called a derivation node, which is represented by an ellipse. A diamond and a box represent a derived node and a primary fact node respectively. An example logical attack graph is displayed in Figure 2 . For example, in Table 2 , we have two sample general rules. Rule 1 means that the "competent" "Victim" who operates host computer "H" could access the malicious input "Software" if (1) "MaliciousMachine" can visit "H" by "httpProtocol" and "httpPort", and (2) the attacker is located in the "MaliciousMachine". Rule 2 means the attacker gets the permission "Perm" on the host computer "H", if (1) vulnerability exists in the "Software" on host computer "H" that can be reached by "remote Client" with privilege escalation-"privEscalation"; (2) the "Victim" has the permission "Perm" on the host computer "H"; and (3) the competent "Victim" who operates host computer "H" accesses the malicious input-"Software".
In the interactive rules, the capital identifier in every literal is a variable that will be instantiated by concrete terms during Prolog run time. MulVAL uses an input file to hold all the concrete terms (facts). For example, Table 3 holds the facts that correspond to two rules in Table 2 . If a query is made to Rule 2 in Table 2 , Prolog interpreter will instantiate all variables by concrete terms in Table 3 to  decide if corresponding literals in Table 2 are true, and if the evaluation on the rules succeeds. If it succeeds, this rule records the successful derivation into a trace file, which forms the attack path. The trace steps of querying Rule 2 form an attack graph in Figure 3 . 
internet). //The attacker is from Internet competent(employee). //The user of the workstation is a competent employee hacl(workStation,internet,httpProtocol,httpPort). //Workstation can be accessed from Internet hasAccount(employee,workStation,root).
//The employee has root privilege on the workStation isClient(MaliciousSite).
//The employee accessed a malicious link eviExists(workStation,'CVE-2009-1918',MalicousSite). //The workstation has CVE-2009-1918 vulnerability, which can be triggered by accessing a malicious link vulProperty('CVE-2009-1918',remoteClient,privEscalation). //This vulnerability allows the attacker comprise the machine
The logical statement and reasoning in MulVAL greatly reduces the size complexity of an attack graph. However, even with this model, a logical attack graph is still too large even for a small network, since this reasoning engine traverses all possible derivation paths. Forensics analysts need visualization tools to look at such an attack graph. Besides, because such a logical attack graph is constructed by using vulnerability information, some attack path(s) might be missing or incorrect if the corresponding exploit/vulnerability information is not complete or correct [16] . These drawbacks are hindrance for us to use an attack graph to do forensics analysis, which is the reason why we use evidence to construct attack scenarios for forensics analysis. In this paper, we propose to use and extend MulVAL reasoning rules to achieve this. Figure 3 : An Attack Graph Generated by Using Rules in Table 2 against Facts in Table 3 6
. OUR REASONING BASED MODEL
This section explains our model that uses and extends MulVAL to correlate event related evidence including alerts and log to create an evidence graph. The sample model is shown in Figure 4 (different shapes represent different processing stages). In this model, we first preprocess the evidence that is related to corresponding security events, and then use a three-stage process to construct the attack scenario in the form of a graph.
Pre-processing Evidence
As mentioned in 2.1, in order to reduce the large quantities and false positives of alerts, we adopted the method in [5] for the logging. At this stage, we pre-process IDS alerts and log information to serve the next three-stage evidence correlation process. First, we remove all alerts and log information whose IP addresses are not related to the attacked network. Afterwards, we categorize the alerts or log information as primary evidence and secondary evidence. While primary evidence is explicit and direct about the attack, the secondary evidence is implicit. One example of a primary evidence is an alert from a IDS system. An example of a secondary evidence is that "only the attacker was logged in at that time". We mainly use primary evidence to reconstruct the attack scenarios. Only when the primary evidence is not available, we use corresponding secondary evidence. In our experiment, we have following alerts as primary evidence: (A) "SHELLCODE x86 inc ebx NOOP" alerts that are from the attacker to workstations; (2) "SQL Injection Attempt --1=1" alerts from the attacker to "Portal" Web Service; (3) "WEB-MISC cross site scripting attempt" alerts from the attacker to the administrator. Our second evidence includes other log information recorded by webservers and the database server, which includes all clients' web access and database query history.
Because XSB-ODBC interface allows XSB users to query databases through ODBC connections, we formalize evidence to SQL records by using the following attributes: ID, Timestamp, Source IP, Destination IP, Content, Vulnerability and Validation (See Table 4 as example). Here, "vulnerability" holds its NVD item that corresponds to the evidence [19] . The field "validation" is used to determine if an alert is a false alert or not. To validate an attack, we use tools to investigate the attacked host computers, confirming that the attack has been successfully launched. Because there can be multiple alerts or log items on the same attack action, in order to save storage and improve the efficiency, we only save one instance of the repeated alerts. Besides, we formalize the vulnerability information from NVD to a database table as given in Table 5 , using it to pre-evaluate the admissibility of corresponding evidence. For example, according to Table  5 , "CVE-2009-1918" only works in IE, so the admissibility of the alert towards a Linux machine should be zero. The admissibility is up to the judge, but our evaluation could provide important reference to the court.
Correlation Stage 1: Inductive Reasoning
In order to correlate alerts and other evidence, we take the timestamp of preprocessed evidence as the order to reason if there is any causality between the attack states represented by the corresponding evidence. Because MulVAL reasoning rules use vulnerability information as Datalog literals, we use the corresponding "Vulnerability" to represent a piece of evidence. In this case, we can take For example, in Figure 5 , by querying the reasoning rules in Table 2 on the alert in Table 4 ( "SHELLCODE x86 inc ebx NOOP--Buffer Overflow Attack"), we got the derived result that the workstation could be compromised. Because there is no available evidence in evidence SQL database showing that the workstation has been compromised, we used tools to investigate the workstation and were able to find the data to prove that the workstation has been compromised. Correspondingly, we correlated the attacker to the "compromised" workstation via the "buffer overflow attack" evidence.
The above correlation is a forward traversing process, which uses rules to find the consequence (post-condition) of an attack indicated by the corresponding evidence. We call it inductive reasoning.
In the case where no any evidence can be found to validate the derived attack consequence, we use an antiforensics database (Table 6 ) and the corresponding technique described in [12] to reconstruct the attack scenario. Our paper [12] discusses this method in details.
Correlation Stage 2: Abductive Reasoning
If inductive reasoning cannot correlate evidence in the Alert/Log evidence table to form an attack step, we use abductive reasoning to find the cause of a given piece of alert/log evidence. For example, if we know that a certain alert can be generated only from this application then we can create a hypothesis that "this application must be running". This is an example of reasoning using abduction. We may not see any explicit evidence of this application as the attacker might have deleted all the evidences. It is possible that a combination of some sequence of events can possibly produce a given piece of available alert or log information.
Hypothesis is needed for abductive reasoning. Specifically, by analyzing the given evidence (validated alert or log information), forensics experts could use their empirical expert knowledge or NVD advisory database to determine what attack would cause the attack consequence represented by the given evidence. By using this hypothesis as the attack cause, we do inductive reasoning as mentioned in 6.2, seeing if we can get the expected derived result matching the given evidence. If such a match or several matches exist, it proves that the hypothesis could be the right attack cause of the attack consequence represented by the given evidence. Therefore, investigators can investigate further to find supporting evidence in order to substantiate and validate the hypothesis. As mentioned in 6.2, in the case where there is no supporting evidence, the antiforensics database and technique described in [12] should be used, because the attacker might have used antiforensics techniques to destroy any evidence. Different forensics experts might have different opinions, and it is possible that the defense rebuts the arguments presented by the prosecution or present an alternative scenario that fits the evidence presented by the prosecution. As such, we apply the same reasoning rules to all possible hypotheses on the attack cause of the given evidence, comparing the derived results to see if any of them is more reasonable and convincing than alternatives. In order to easily compare different hypotheses, we implemented a GUI interface to display different hypotheses and their corresponding derived results from the reasoning.
Stage 3: Global Reasoning
At this stage, we do a final examination on the evidence graphs generated from stage 1 and stage 2, which might have incomplete attack path(s), since only the consecutive attack steps are correlated. To do so, we map the constructed evidence graphs to the corresponding logical attack, examining if there is any unsupported attack path [11] . If such an unsupported attack path exists, with the information provided by the logical attack graph, we do abductive reasoning from stage 2, seeing if the unsupported attack path could be completed. Our paper [11] has a detailed discussion about the mapping algorithm, which is used here. In order to reduce the attack graph size, we only use the related vulnerability and network/computer configuration to get a sub-attack graph [18] .
CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a network forensics model, which extends a Prolog logic based system, MulVAL, to automate the causality correlation between evidence collected from security events in an enterprise network. In this model, we use different methods, including inductive reasoning, abductive reasoning and mapping the evidence to a logical attack graph to construct an evidence graph for network forensics analysis. In order to resolve the problem of missing evidence, an anti-forensics database was used to explain how the attack was launched. Our case study showed that such a reasoning system could automate the network forensics analysis, even under the situations where the attacker has destroyed the evidence.
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